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ABSTRACT 
The intertwining of assertions and presuppositions in utterances affects the way 
a text is perceived in the source language (SL) and the target language (TL). 
Presuppositions can be thought of as shared assumptions that form the 
background of the asserted meaning. To transíate presuppositions as assertions, 
or vice versa, can distort the thematic meaning of the SL text and produce a text 
with a different information structure. Since a good translation is not simply 
concerned with transferring the propositional content of the SL text, but also its 
other semantic and pragmatic components, including thematic meaning, a 
special attention should be accorded to the translation of presupposition. This 
article examines the intrinsic relation between presupposition and thematic 
meaning, why the concept is relevant to translation theory, and how 
presupposition can affect the structure and understanding of discourse. 
Unshared presuppositions are major obstacles in translation, as cultural 
concepts may be conveyed through expressions that yield presuppositions. To 
attain an optimal proximity to the SL text, presupposition needs to be singled out 
as a distinct aspect of meaning, and distinctions need to be made between 
definite and indefinite meaning, topic and comment, topic and focus, 
presupposition and entailment, and presupposition and implicature. 
1. Perceptional Relativity 
The rtotion of figure and ground in Gestalt theory seems to capture the relevance of 
presupposition to translation theory. According to this school of psychology, the perception 
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of a figure in an image is both relatíve to and influenced by the perceptíon of its background, 
and vice versa. In Gestalt psychology, the context plays a crucial role in the process of 
perception, and images are perceived as whole entities rather than the sum of scattered 
parts. In the same way, an utterance can be perceived in terms of figure and ground, where 
the figure is the asserted meaning, or, as Levinson (1983: 180) points out, "the main point 
of what is said, while the ground is the set of presuppositions against which the figure is 
assessed". The impücation of this analogy is that the translation of a particular utterance 
requires the preservation of the very relativity in which its assertions and presuppositions 
are perceived in the original. If this perceptional relativity is not maintained in the target 
language (TL), the translation cannot be judged as accurate. 
Few translators would dispute the claim that there is more to a good translation than the 
mere relay of the propositional content of the source language (SL) text. Apart from 
fulfilling its basic function of expressing SL propositions, a good translation is also 
supposed to preserve the relative importance assigned to the different SL information 
constituents. This generally involves the preservation of the order in which given/new 
information is presented and the presuppositions imparted in the text as background 
assumptions. In such a translation, SL information constituents would be perceived in the 
TL text in their right perspective. The importance of preserving SL presuppositions in the 
TL text can hardly be exaggerated. 
There is also a large consensus that both within and outside a given language, the 
propositional content of a particular sentence can be expressed in a variety of (quasi-
synonymous) syntactic structures. Thus the propositional meaning of the Engüsh sentences 
1E, 2E, and 3E below is more or less the same, and so is the propositional meaning of their 
respective Frenen counterparts IF, 2F, and 3F. 
(1) e. Alfonso wrote this story. 
(1) f. Alfonso a écrit cette histoire. 
(2) e. It was Alfonso who wrote this story. 
(2) f. C'est Alfonso qui a écrit cette histoire. 
(3) e. This story was written by Alfonso. 
(3) f. Cette histoire a été écritepar Alfonso. 
At a deeper level, though, it would not be accurate to transíate 1E into 2F or 3F despite their 
apparent propositional similarity. Ñor would it be accurate to transíate 2E into 1F or 3F, or 
3E into IF or 2F. To transíate 2E, for example, into IF would necessarily ignore the 
transfer of the presuppositions imparted by the cleft construction in 2E, namely that some 
unique entity (Alfonso or any other entity) did in fact write this story. Thus the degree of 
proximity a translation may have to the original depends in large measure on the aecuracy 
of relaying not only the conceptual/propositional meaning of the SL text, but its thematic 
meaning as well. Failure to observe the distribution of information in terms of presupposed, 
given, or new information would result in some loss of meaning and inconsisteney witli the 
intentions of the SL text author. 
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Presupposition is a crucial element of thematic meaning. It is a highly controversial 
aspect of non-conceptual meaning thathas been contemplated by logicians, philosophers, 
and linguists since Frege's work on sense and reference in 1892.1 The elusiveness of the 
concept has given rise to many conflicting theories, definitions, and views, and has 
manifested itself in an extensive literature that is highly technical and plagued with 
disagreements and sometimes contradictions. Most of the complex and hard-to-solve 
debates revolve round the defeasibility of presuppositions in certain linguistic and extra-
linguistic contexts, and what carne to be traditionally known as 'the projection problem for 
presupposition.2 Central to this debate is the question of whether to account for the notion 
in the orderly área of semantics, or in the less orderly speaker-oriented field of pragmatics. 
Recent work on presupposition suggests that the notion cannot be adequately explained in 
a purely semantic model, as it Ms to explain why some presuppositions 'evapórate' in 
certain contexts, and why others fail to be inherited by the whole compound sentence. A 
more viable alternative is provided by pragmatic theory, which places speakers, hearers, 
and contextual considerations inthe core of this relation. Some linguists (e.g. Leech, 1981) 
argüe that the relation is partly logical, and partly pragmatic, noting that the área of 
presupposition is the área where semantics interacts with pragmatics. 
While the concept of presupposition appears to be universal because of its intrinsic 
connection with such notions as 'shared knowledge' and 'definiteness'. the ways it is 
expressed in different languages are not. This can obviously be attributed to the peculiarity 
of the lexical and grammatical systems of individual languages, a peculiarity that makes the 
concept even more relevant to a linguistic/pragmatic theory of translation. It should be 
noted, however, that whereas the peculiarity of presupposition-triggers across different 
languages is relevant and appealing to translation theory, the question of whether the 
concept belongs to semantics or pragmatics, or why presuppositions evapórate in certain 
contexts, seems less relevant and appealing. What is perhaps more relevant to translation 
theory and practice is the identification of the phenomenon itself in source and target 
languages, and the potential translation techniques that could be used to handle it, and the 
range of lexemes and structures with which it is bound. Tríese include definite descriptions, 
factive and counterfactive predicates, impücative verbs, change-of-state verbs, verbs of 
judging, cleft and pseudo-cleft constructions, comparisons, and some conditional structures. 
The interrelation between presupposition, thematic meaning, shared knowledge, and given 
information is quite direct: the thematic presentation of a linguistic message is determined 
by the presuppositions imparted in this message, and these presuppositions generally reflect 
the amount of shared knowledge and given information in the context of discourse. 
According to Givón (1989:135-136), the sources of presupposed information are the shared 
situational context, the shared generic context, and the shared discourse context. Failure to 
transíate the concept would normally result in distorting the thematic meaning of the SL 
text. A similar effect can also result from the addition in the TL text of presuppositions that 
do not exist in the original. 
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2. Presupposition and the structure of discourse 
Generally discussed under the rubric of given/new information, thematic meaning plays an 
integral part ia the structuring and understanding of discourse. Distinctions associated with 
this type of meaning include those between given and new informatíon, theme and rheme, 
topic and comment, topic and focus, and focus and presupposition. Prince (1981: 225) 
remarks that the general notion of given versus new information appears in the literature 
under the terms old/new, known/new, and presupposition/focus. The term 'given/new 
information' isusedinanalyzing cleftandpseudo-cleftconstructions andtopicalization, and 
the way discourses are structured and understood. Prince distinguishes three levéis of 
givenness (ibid., 226-231). One level specifies that the speaker assumes that the hearer can 
predict or could nave predicted that a particular linguistic item will or would occur in a 
particular position within a sentence. Another level specifies that the speaker assumes that 
the hearer has or could appropriately have some particular entity in his/her consciousness 
at the time of hearing the utterance. The third level specifies that the speaker assumes that 
the hearer knows, assumes, or can infer a particular piece of information, but is not 
necessarily thinking about it. 
Given information has also been defined as information believed by the addressor to be 
known to the addressee either because it is present in the context, or already mentioned in 
the discourse. New information, on the other hand, is information the addressor believes 
to be unknown to the addressee (Brown and Yule, 1983: 154). The term 'given' 
(information) is used by Clark and Clark (1977: 92) to refer to those presuppositions 
attributed to clauses within sentences. According to Clark and Clark, a kind of given-new 
contract exists between speakers and hearers, whereby 
the speaker agrees (a) to use given information to refer to information she thinks the listener 
can uniquely identify from what he already knows and (b) to use new information to refer to 
information she believes to be true but is not already known to the listener. 
According to this contract, a listener can trust that the given information conveys 
information he/she is able to identify uniquely. Both speaker and addressee understand that 
given information is information the speaker believes they both agree on, and that the 
speaker is asserting his/her beliefc about. In this sense the notion of presupposition overlaps 
with the notion of given information in Clark and Clark's terminology. 
As Chafe (1970: 233) remarks, every language is distinctive in the way it represents 
thematic meaning in its surface structure, and the major role in such representation is played 
by word order and intonation. Lyons (1977: 510) also argües that languages vary 
considerably withrespectto whether, andhow, they grammaticalize differences of thematic 
structure. These differences, he points out, are "such as to cast doubtupon the possibiüty 
of translating even the propositional content of an utterance, both accurately and naturally, 
from one language into another." For this reason, the translation of thematic meaning 
requires a heightened awareness of the different tools that could be potentially used to 
reaüze this type of meaning in both SL and TL texts. Knowledge of word order and the 
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effects of particular lexemes and syntactic patterns in both languages is a prerequisite for 
that matter. 
Discourse is more easily processed when speakers/writers introduce new information 
with indefínite expressions and subsequently refer to it with definite expressions that 
normally yield presuppositions. Such definite expressions can be noun phrases or 
pronominals used anaphorically or exophorically, although definite noun phrases may be 
used cataphorically to supply new information and existential presuppositions at once. This 
device is commonly used by novelists in the opening of a narrative as a deviation from the 
norm to achieve a stylistic effect. In this regard, Hurford and Heasley (1983: 72) remarle 
that the use of definite noun phrases at the beginning of the narrative has the effect of 
drawing the reader into the narrative fast, "by giving the impression that the writer and 
reader already share a number of contextual assumptions." A secondary effect of this device 
is to créate a sort of intimacy between the author and the reader so that the information the 
writer wishes to convey will be more readily accepted by the reader. To maintain this 
intimacy and false impression about contextual assumptions in a translation, the SL 
given/new order should be preserved in the TL text, not only in terms of definiteness and 
indefiniteness, but also in terms of word arrangement. This is especially the case in 
translation from English into Arabic, or vice versa, since Arabic has a very flexible word 
order.3 
The grounds on which speakers make assumptions about what their hearers know or 
believe can be described in terms of sources of shared knowledge, or in terms of contextual 
files, such as the generic file, the deictic file, and the text file (Givón, 1989: 207). The 
generic file refers to the knowledge held in common by all members of the language-culture 
group. This includes knowledge of the world and the culture, and therefore the shared 
lexicón. The deictic file has to do with the knowledge shared by speakers and hearers 
because of their presence together at a speech situation. The text file refers to the knowledge 
shared by the participants because of what was said earlier in the discourse or in prior text. 
The generic, text, and deictic sources of definiteness are illustrated in the following 
examples due to Givón (1989: 207): 
(4) "... I got up this morning and the sun was shining..." (Generic). 
(5) "... He saw a man and a woman. The woman was taU..." (Text). 
(6) "... Take this chair and put it there..." (Deictic). 
Some lexemes and structures nave been Usted in the literature as sources of presuppositions. 
These will be briefly discussed below, but before we turn to them, some important 
distinctions need to be made to identify presupposed meaning. 
3. Presupposed versus no-presupposed meaning 
For a translator who wishes to attain maximal proximity to the SL text, the distinction 
between presupposed and non-presupposed meaning is particularly important. Following 
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Leech (1981:289), the distinction can be made at three levéis: defínite versus indefínite 
meaning, topic versus comment, and focus versus presupposition. Failure to draw the line 
between them can easily cause confusión. 
Defínite expressions are closely linked to existence and reference. They give rise to 
existential presuppositions, that is, presuppositions that assume the existence of a given 
referent in some world, whether real, imaginary, fictional, or hypothetical. In saying 'the 
car won 't start'. a speaker conveys the presupposition that some car exists in the world, and 
can be identified uniquely in the contextual knowledge of both speaker and hearer. In fact, 
the notion of presupposition was developed in debates about reference, which is simply a 
relationship between parts of a language and entities that exist (in real or imaginative terms) 
outside that language. 
Definiteness and indefiniteness can be contrasted through the use of defínite and 
indefinite articles. By using a defínite article such as the, le, or el, a speaker urges hearer 
to interpret the referent associated with the article as designating a particular speech 
situation and a particular assumption. The indefinite article, on the other hand, is a tool to 
introduce new information. In some languages, the indefínite article occurs after, not 
before, the noun, as in Classical Arabic, where indefiniteness is expressed with the bound 
morphemes -on, -an, -in, -oon, or -een. The use of one morpheme rather than another is 
determined by the position of the noun in the sentence and its grammatical function. For 
example, -on occurs at the end of a singular noun in a subject position, whereas -een occurs 
at the end of a plural noun in an object position. In colloquial Arabic, though, indefiniteness 
is expressed by using no article at all. This is different from languages such as English, 
French, and Spanish which express indefiniteness with indefinite articles that always 
precede the noun, such as alan in English, un/une in French, and uno/una in Spanish. This 
difference in the article system is worth notíng when translating from or into Arabic, 
especially as it can affect the presuppositional status of an utterance. 
Defínite expressions include proper nouns, personal pronouns, and noun phrases. A 
semantic categorization of noun phrases divides them in three subclasses —defínite 
descriptions, indefinite noun phrases, and quantified noun phrases. Defínite descriptions 
are expressions that refer to some defínite entity and identify it partly by means of the 
descriptive content of the expression. As Lyons (1995:297) points out, defínite descriptions 
may be factorized into two componente, descriptive and referential. An example of this is 
the defínite expression my book, where the descriptive component is the word book, and the 
purely referential component is the possessive my. The referential component my is non-
descriptive, as it does not identify the entity referred to by describing any of its context-
independent properties. The head-noun book, on the other hand, is more or less descriptive 
of the referent. 
Entity-denoting nouns in English fall into different sortal categories according to the 
essential properties of the classes they refer to. Thus thing is categorially distinguishable 
from person as the former denotes a class of inanimate entities, whereas the latter denotes 
a subclass of animate entities of which humans are the prototypical members. Another 
subclass of noun phrases is that of indefinite expressions, which are context-dependent and 
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used with specific reference, such as a woman in A woman wearing sunglasses asked about 
you. A third subclass is that of quantified noun phrases such as every child, all women, etc. 
Both the non-descriptive and descriptíve components of defínite descriptions give rise to two 
different kinds of presupposition, existential and categorial. In uttering the expression the 
woman in an ordinary context, a speaker commits himself to two things: the existential 
presupposition that the referent exists, and the categorial presupposition that the referent is 
a member of a certain category —in this case, the category of persons. Violation of 
existential presupposition can be seen in the classic example The king ofFrance is bald, 
when the referent does not exist. Violation of categorial presupposition can be seen in 
examples like The Eiffel Tower is clever (Allwood et al., 1977: 150). The categorial 
presupposition is violated because the predícate be clever presupposes that its subject is 
something equipped with a mind. As Seuren (1985: 233) points out, the fulfillment of 
categorial presuppositions is directly checked against a fund of generalized background 
knowledge.4 Speakers need not inspect the world in order to find out if a tower, for 
example, can be clever, or if a volcano is an anímate being so that it can properly be said 
to be asleep or awake. In this regard, a substantial difference between existential 
presuppositions and categorial presuppositions is that a text whose existential 
presuppositions "are not fulfilled can still be a coherent and perfectly intelligible text", 
whereas "a text with categorial presuppositions unfulfilled will soon become gibberish" 
(Seuren, 1985: 233). 
A second ievel of distinguishing presupposed from non-presupposed meaning relates 
to a distinction between topic and comment. Comparing these two notions, Hockett (1958: 
201) maintains that topics in Engüsh and other familiar languages of Europe are usually 
subjects and comments predicates. Sentential topic can be roughly defined as the entity 
about which something is said. It is associated in English with the notion of given 
information, which generally comes first. Comment, on the other hand, is the statement 
made about the topic, and is generally associated with new information, which, as Nunan 
(1993: 45) maintains, comes last "as a rough rale of thumb." Topic is sometimes referred 
to as the psychological subject, because it does not necessarily coincide with the subject of 
a sentence. Ñor does it nave to come first in a sentence, even though it may be the subject, 
but in unmarked cases the topic usually identifies with the first propositional constituent. 
Observing the discourse topic of a text is essential in both shaping and translating a piece 
of language. At the level of the single sentence, it is also important to observe sentential 
topic when discourse is created or translated. The relationship between discourse topics and 
presuppositions is traced by Vennemann (1975: 314) who suggests that there is a general 
pool of presuppositions which participants resort to and expand as the discourse proceeds. 
This pool contains information from general knowledge, the context of situation, and the 
completed part of the discourse. From this presuppositional pool, participants derive 
propositions about entities whose existence they need not assert. In normal discourse, each 
participant behaves as if there exists only one presupposition pool shared by all participants. 
According to Brown and Yule (1983: 80), there is a set of discourse subjects which is part 
of the general presuppositional pool. Participants who share the assumption that given 
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discourse subjects exist do not normally assert their existence. If the participante know each 
other well, then the number of discourse subjects in a presuppositional pool is likely to be 
very large. 
Distinguishing focus from topic, Dik (1980: 211) states that topic, which marks 
constituents about which the predication is used to predicate something in the given 
pragmatic setting, belongs to given information, whereas focus usually marks new 
information. Topic and focus, however, may overlap, especially inmarked cases, when the 
point of beginning an utterance with a certain constituent is to impart new, rather than 
given, information. Also, given information may be focused on if there is something new 
to be said about it, for purposes of emphasis or contrast. 
Corresponding to the notion of topic is the formal category of theme, which Brown and 
Yule(1983:126)usetoreferto "the left-most constituent of the sentence." For each simple 
sentence, there is a theme which is that part of a sentence which occurs first and can be 
described as the starting point of the utterance, and a rheme which is everything that follows 
in the sentence, and which consists in a commentary on the theme, and has the most 
communicative importance.5 Like topic and comment, the terms theme and rheme are used 
to explain how discourse units are assigned various degrees of importance and arranged to 
handle given and new information. Thematic elements, as Hatim and Masón (1990: 212-
213) remark, are context-dependent, and consequently of lesser communicative importance 
than context-independent rhematic elements. For Halliday (1970: 161), the theme is a 
component in the complex notion of a subject a psychological subject similar to "the peg on 
which the message is hung, the theme being the body of the message. "6He further describes 
the information structure notions of given and new as often 
conflated with theme and rheme under the single heading 'topic and comment'; the latter, 
however, is (like the traditional notion of 'subject') a complex notion, and the association of 
theme with given, rheme with new, is subject to the usual 'good reason' principie already 
referred to - there is freedom of choice, but the theme will be associated with the 'given' and 
the rheme with the 'new' unless there is good reason for choosing some other alignment 
(1970: 162). 
The notion of theme, as Brown and 'Yule (1983:133) remark, has two main functions. First, 
it connects back and links in to the previous discourse, maintaining a coherent point of view. 
Second, it serves as a point of departure for the further development of discourse. 
Leech (1981:292) considere the topic/comment división conducive to the interpretation 
of presupposition. Like presupposition, the topic of a sentence has a tendency to be 
unaffected by negation. This is clearly the case in passive sentences which are equivalent 
to their active counterparts in terms of conceptual meaning, but different in thematic 
meaning. For example, sentences like (4) and (5) below are felt to have the same truth-
values, but their negations, (6) and (7), are felt to be slightly different: 
(7) The killing of Francis Ferdinand caused the Great War. 
(8) The Great War was caused by the killing of Francis Ferdinand. 
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(9) The killing of Francis Ferdinand did not cause the Great War. 
(10) The Great War was not caused by the killing of Francis Ferdinand. 
(11) There was a Great War. 
Whereas it is possible to infer (11) from (10), itis not possible to draw the same inference 
from (9). When a sentence is negated, its comment is negated too, but the topic remains 
unnegated. In the examples above, (7) entails (11), whereas (8) presupposes it, and the 
difference between (7) and (8) is a difference not in conceptual meaning, but in the way the 
message is presented in terms of word order, focus, presupposition, and thematic meaning. 
And it is a difference worth observing in translation. The thematic choice of topic has the 
positive effect of adding emphasis to some aspect of the conceptual message, and the 
negative effect of suppressing certainpossibilities of interpretation, whichareimphcitinthe 
conceptual meaning. 
The term focus is used to refer to the information at the center of the speaker's 
communicative interest. In this sense, Crystal (1991: 276) remarks, it is opposed to 
presupposition, which corresponds to what the Prague school has viewed as given 
information. Lyons (1977: 509) remarks that the terms focus and presupposition relate to 
aspects of information structure from the point of view that "expressions that convey new 
information are stressed, and expressions conveying information that the speaker presents 
as given, or recoverable from context, are unstressed." The term focus typically 
corresponds to the term rheme, which is used by the Prague school linguists to refer to the 
expression which contains the information the speaker wishes to communicate. 
The notion of focus is useful in drawing the fine between presupposition and assertion. 
Focus is typically achieved through phonology, rather than through syntax or semantics. 
The focus of information realized through accentuation of a certain syllable can also be 
realized syntactically through cleft sentences. The phonological and syntactic realization of 
focus is shown in the examples below, where the sentences are identical in everything 
except that the focus is different in each sentence: 
Phonological and Syntactic Realization of Focus 
Phonological Realization Syntactic Realization 
(12) His wife drove to Madrid last JUNE. It was in JUNE that his wife drove to Madrid 
(13) His wife drove to MADRID last June. It was to MADRID that his wife drove last June. 
(14) His wife DROVE to Madrid last June. It was BY CAR that his wife went to Madrid. 
(15) His WIFE drove to Madrid last June. It was his WIFE who drove to Madrid last June 
In the sentences above, the element bearing the nucleus is the focus of information, while 
the remainder of each sentence is the presupposition. The difference between focus and 
presupposition in (12)-(15) is illustrated below: 
Presupposition Focus 
(16) His wife went to Madrid at some time x x = last June 
(17) His wife went to some place x last June x = Madrid 
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(18) His wife went by some means x to Madrid last June x = car 
(19) Some person x drove to Madrid last June x = his wife 
Insofar as (12)-(15) mean the same as their cleft counterparts, they pass the negation test for 
logical presupposition, and presuppose (16)-(19). In the case of cleft sentences, their 
presuppositional status can be tested by the fact that their negative sentences have the same 
presuppositions: 
(20) It wasn't to Madrid that his wife drove last June. 
The negation of (13) also seems to have the same presupposition: 
(21) His wife didn't drive to MADRID last June. 
Exploring the intrinsic relation between presuppositions and marked focus, Enkvist (1980: 
134-152) distinguishes three kinds of foci-corrective focus, emphatic focus, and 
information focus. Corrective focus is used by speakers to repair flaws in conversation by 
repeating the word, and laying a distinctive stress on a particular syllable of the word. 
Enkvist considers the basic function of focus marking to be the evocation of a 
presuppositional set, and the presentation of one member of the set as new information. 
Other functions include the widening of the range of oíd, shared, and presupposed 
information. Whether the evocation of the presuppositional set or the presentation of a set 
member as new information is primary depends on the structure and on the context. Thus, 
in saying (22) 
(22) MARIAN spoke to the manager 
with a stress on 'Marian'. a speaker presupposes that his addressee already knows that 
someone spoke to the manager. The presuppositional set of the focally marked constituent 
comprises all those valúes that can be inserted for the corresponding variable 'someone' in 
the presupposition. The change of focus changes the presuppositional set, as in (23): 
(23) Marian SPOKE to the manager. 
In this sentence, the presuppositional set consists of all those verbs that express things 
Marian could have done to the manager, and from among which 'spoke' was selected. 
Sentence (23) could have been turned into a passive to place the new information, Marian, 
into the sentence-final position. The reason why a speaker should prefer an active sentence, 
and mark the focus as in (22), is to evoke a presuppositional set that could not be evoked 
otherwise. Selecting one member out of a presuppositional set amounts to contrasting it with 
the other members of the same presuppositional set, and results in conveying new 
information. 
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While the focally marked item cardes and pinpoints new informatíon, it increases the 
range of given informatíon carried by the focally unmarked items in the tone group. This 
is shown in the following examples, drawn from Enkvist (1980): 
(24) The tall girl in blue shorts carried the red ball. 
(25) The TALL girl in blue shorts carried the red ball. 
(26) The tall girl in BLUE shorts carried the red ball. 
In (24), which is focally unmarked, the theme, which presumably consists of shared 
informatíon, comprises the entire subject noun phrase. In (25), only 'tall' is new 
informatíon, whereas the existence of more than one girl in blue shorts is presupposed. In 
(26), only 'blue' is marked as new informatíon, and the existence of more than one tall girl 
in shorts would be presupposed. 
The linear order and the thematic informatíon structure of a sentence is affected by such 
operatíons as passivization, topicalization, cleft, there-insertion, dislocation, and 
extraposition, all of which constraint the choice of focally marked items. Enkvist mentions 
three mechanisms that regúlate the thematic arrangement of the sentence. First, lexical 
thematizations can be carried out with the aid of lexical converses such as (27) and (28): 
(27) Martha sold the guitar to Jane. 
(28) Jane bought the guitar from Martha. 
Secondly, syntactíc thematizations can be achieved through a change in the syntactíc 
pattern, by using a passive for example: 
(29) The two ministers attended the meeting. 
(30) The meeting was attended by the two ministers. 
Thirdly, there are topicalizatíons or commentizations, which only front or postpone an item 
without concomitant changes in the syntactíc structure, as in (31) and (32): 
(31) Fred has written the letter. 
(32) The letter Fred has written. 
Of the three types of thematic arrangement, topicalizatíons are the most strongly marked. 
In a topicalized structure, the fronted element often evokes a presuppositional set 
recoverable from an earlier part of the text. The final element is strongly rhematic, carrying 
new informatíon and often linking up with something coming later in the text. 
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4. Presupposition as inference 
Another level of distinction can also be made between presupposition and two other types 
of inference, namely entailment and implicature, the former considered a fairly central 
semantic relation, and the latter a purely pragmatic relation. 
Entailment, also known as logical implication, is a logical relation that exists between 
propositions such that for a proposition p to entail a proposition q it is necessary in all 
worlds in which p is true that q be true. Accordingly, (33) entails (34), but does not 
presuppose it: 
(33) The crocodile killed the deer. 
(34) The deer died . 
In the example above it is impossible to think of any circumstances in which the first 
sentence is true and the second false, no matter what the context is. 
Entailment is a transitive relation, that is, it applies curnulatively: if p entails q, and q 
entails r, thereforep entails r. 
(35 [p]) I saw three men. 
(36[q]) I saw two men. 
(37[r]) I saw human beings. 
Entailment explains how two sentences can be paraphrases of each other. In this case, the 
two sentences mutually entail each other so that whenever one is true the other must also be 
true. As a result of this mutual entailment, each of the two sentences has the same set of 
entailments as the other: 
(38) It is easy to learn Spanish. 
(39) Spanish is easy to learn. 
Ithasbeenargued(e.g., Burton-Roberts, 1989: 9-11) that the negation of a proposition p 
entailing a proposition q destroys the entailment whereas the negation of a proposition/? 
presupposing a proposition q does not affect the presupposition. Thus (40) entails (41), but 
presupposes (42): 
(40) Somebody stole my car. 
(41) Somebody stole a vehicle. 
(42) I have a car. 
Presupposition and entailment have one property in common: both satisfy a conjunction 
test. If a sentence is conjoined with the negation of its entailment or presupposition, the 
result is semantic anomaly. In the examples beíow (43) entails (44) and presupposes (45): 
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(43) The rescue team managed to save Lucy 
(44) The rescue team saved Lucy. 
(45) The rescue team tried to save Lucy. 
When (43) is conjoined with the negation of (44) as in (46) or the negation of (45) as in (47), 
the resulting sentences are anomalous: 
(46) !The rescue team managed to save Lucy, but didn't save Lucy. 
(47) !The rescue team didn't try to save Lucy, but managed to save Lucy. 
Presupposition is also similar to entailment in that it is also a transitive relation. If a 
proposition/? presupposes q, and q presupposes r, then p presupposes r. In the examples 
below (48) presupposes (49), and (49) presupposes (50). Then (48) presupposes (50): 
(48[p]) The King of France is wise. 
(49[<?]) There exists a king of France. 
(50[r]) There exists a country by the ñame of France. 
While entailment is a logical inference carried by propositions and sentences (in the sense 
of idealized 'grammatical' strings), conversational imphcature is a pragmatic inference 
carried by utterances. The term implicature is used by Grice (1975) to refer to what a 
speaker can imply, suggest, or mean, as distinct from what he/she literally means. 
Conversational implicature is based on a pragmatic principie that involves the cooperation 
of speakers in communication. This 'Cooperative Principie' has four maxims , known as 
the maxims of Quantity, Quaüty, Relation, and Manner. The maxim of Quantity provides 
that sufficient mformation be given to ensure smooth communication. The maxim of Quaüty 
implies that in normal cooperative circumstances, when a speaker asserts something he 
implicates that he believes it, and when he asks a question he implicates that he sincerely 
wants an answer, and when he promises to do something he implicates that he intends to do 
it. The maxim of Relation provides that a speaker's utterance be relevant to the situation at 
hand. This principie underlies the connectivity of exchanges that might otherwise appear 
fragmented and disconnected, such as the following example due to Grice (1975): 
A: I am out of petrol 
B: There is a garage around the córner. 
In this exchange A does not simply describe some state of affairs, but rather makes a request 
for help. B's answer is cooperative in that it acknowledges the request, and responds 
positively by stating that there is a garage the córner, opening and selling petrol. 
The maxim of Manner provides that speakers be perspicuous, orderly, and brief. 
Resorting to a different language, jargon, or special words is a discourse strategy to deny 
the audience access to part, or all, of the meanings of an exchange.7 
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Grice(1975:50; 57-5 8) liste sixproperfesof implicature. Apart from the basic property 
of being inferences carried by utterances, rather than sentences, implicatures exMbit the 
properties of calculability, defeasibility, non-detachability, non-conventionality, and 
indeterminacy. The calculability of implicature explains why the essential properties are 
largely predictable. For an addressee to be able to calcúlate that a particular conversational 
implicature is present, he must know, or believe he knows, the conventional or literal 
meaning or sense of the utterance, and the Cooperative Principie and its maxims. He must 
also know the context, "linguistic and otherwise of the utterance", other parts of 
background information, and that this knowledge must be shared with the speaker (Grice, 
1975:50). The property of defeasibility, wbich also applies to presupposition and most 
pragmatic inferences, means that imphcatures can be cancelled by adding to them some 
additional premises. For example, implicatures can be suspended by zf-clauses: 
(51) Malak has three cars, if not more. 
Implicatures are also directly and overtly deniable without any sense of anomaly: 
(52) Robert has three children, in fact ten. 
Unlike presupposition, implicature is attached to the semantic contení of what is said, not 
to its linguistic form. This has been referred to in the Hterature as the non-detachability of 
implicatures. With the exception of imphcatures arising under the maxim of Manner, they 
cannot be detached from an utterance simply by changing the words of the utterance for 
synonyms. In the examples below, (53) presupposes (54), whereas (55), which seems to be 
semantically and truth-conditionally equivalent to (55), does not imply (54): 
(53) Betty didn't manage to get to work on time. 
(54) Betty tried to get to work on time. 
(55) Betty didn't get to work on time. 
The importance of this property is that it may serve to distinguish conversational 
implicatures from other kinds of pragmatic inference such as presupposition and 
conventional imphcatures. 
Imphcatures are not part of the conventional meaning of linguistic expressions. The fact 
that a speaker needs to know the literal meaning or sense of a sentence before he can 
calcúlate its implicatures in a context implies that the implicatures cannot be part of that 
meaning. This property also follows from the fect that an utterance can be true while its 
implicature is false, and vice versa as in the example below: 
(56)PatrickhitFred, 
which by Quantity would implicate (57): 
Presupposition, Perceptual Relativity and Translation Theory 51 
(57) Patrick didn't kill Fred by hitting him. 
If it were a íact that Patrick had killed Fred, a speaker, in saying just (56), would be 
violating the cooperative principie, and more specifically, the maxim of Quantity by 
withholding informatíon. A speaker attempting to mislead might say (56) in a situation 
where (56) is trae but (57) false. 
The indeterminacy of implicatures means tbatan expression with a single meaning can 
yield different implications on different occasions. Even on one specific occasion, the set 
of associated implicatures may not be exactly determinable. Many implicatures can arise 
from(58): 
(58) William is a machine. 
As Levinson (1983: 118) points out, an utterance like (58) could convey that William is 
cold, or efficient, or never stops working, or puffe and blows, or has little in the way of grey 
matter, or indeed any and all of these. So implicatures can have a certain indeterminacy in 
at least some cases, incompatible with the stable determínate senses usually assumed in 
semantic theories. 
5. Sources of presupposition 
Presuppositions seem to be associated with certain words and structures. These are Usted 
in the literature by philosophers such as Frege (1892/1952) and Sellars (1954), and linguists 
such as Fillmore (1969), Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), Karttunen (1971), and others. 
Presupposition can result from the use of definite expressions, iactive predicates, 
impücative verbs, change-of-state verbs, iteratives, verbs ofjudging, temporal clauses, cleft 
structures, comparisons, nonrestrictive relative clauses, counterfactual conditionals, and 
interrogative sentences. 
Presupposition is closely linked with the notion of definiteness, which involves the 
speaker's assumptions about the hearer's beliefc. A definite expression is a noun phrase that 
a speaker uses to convey the assumption that his addressee will be able to identify its 
referent, usually because it is the only thing of its kind in the context of the utterance, or 
because it is unique in the universe of discourse. The three main types of definite noun 
phrases in English are proper ñames, phrases introduced by a definite determiner, and 
personal pronouns.8 Lyons (1995: 67) points out to the non-universahty, "not just of the 
definite article, but also of anything that might be called a semantic category of definiteness, 
in natural languages." Definite expressions yield existential presuppositions, as in (59): 
(59) The fish is in the fridge, 
where the speaker presupposes the existence of some fish and some fridge that the hearer 
can uniquely identify in the context of discourse. 
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Presupposítions can also be induced by factive predícales (see Kiparsky and Kiparsky, 
1971:345-369). These are predícales which Allwood et al. (1977:150)pointout, "express 
properties or relations involving facts." The list of factive predícales includes regret, aware, 
realize, odd, know, besorry, beproud, beindifferent, beglad, besad, andbeastonishing, 
Green (1989:71) remarks that one kind of factive presupposítions is associated with 
expressions that take a sentential subject or object. The object complements of epistemic 
factives such as know and realize are presupposed as true propositions, and so are the 
subject complements of such predicates as prove and beobvious. Emotive factives such as 
regret, amaze, astonish, and be surprised also presuppose the truth of their complements: 
(60) Kathy regretted that her husband was careless. 
Presupposition: Kathy's husband was careless. 
A wrong translation of the factive verb would not yield the factive presupposition induced 
in the original. 
Presupposítions can also be triggered by change-of-state verbs. These are verbs whose 
lexical meaning denotes a change of state, and therefore they presuppose that some state of 
affairs used to exist but no longer does. The verb die, for instance, denotes the end of a life 
of a certain living entity, and therefore presupposes that the subject of the verb was alive 
before. Such verbs include stop, begin, continué, start,finish, carry on. cease, take, leave, 
enter, come, go, and arrive: 
(61) He stopped smoking. 
Presupposition: He used to smoke. 
Iterative predicates also give rise to presupposítions. Iteratives are lexical ítems which nave 
a property of repetitiveness among their features. Examples of iteratives include again, 
anytnore, anotherjime, callback, restore, and repeaf. 
(62) The pólice arrested him again. 
Presupposition: The pólice arrested him before. 
Verbs such as accuse, Mame, and criticize are said to presuppose that the complement did 
something "wrong" in some way at least from the speaker's viewpoint (Fillmore, 1969: 
121-22). It has been argued that the implications carried by such verbs are not 
presuppositional, as "they are not attributed to the speaker, so much as to the subject of the 
verb of judging" (Levinson, 1983: 182): 
(63) The president was accused of lying to the people. 
Presupposition: Lying to the people is "bad" from the speaker's point of view. 
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Implicative verbs also give rise to presuppositions. The notion of implicative verbs was 
introduced by Karttunen (1971) in a study of some predicates that carry along the 
presupposition that the infinitive complements express trae propositions. Just as Kiparsky 
and Kiparsky (1971) distinguish predicates which presuppose the truth of their complements 
from those which do not, Karttunen (1971: 340-358) also makes an equally important 
distinction among predicates that take infinitive complements. In the Kiparskys' system, the 
predicates which presuppose the truth of their complements are termed lactive, while those 
which are not accompanied by similar presuppositions are called non-facti ve. In Karttunen's 
study, the classes of predicates he singles out are labeled implicative and non-implicative 
depending on their presuppositional properties. His list of implicative predicates includes 
manage, remember, bother, get, daré, core, venture, condescend, happen, be careful, have 
themisfortune, takethetime, take the opportunity, take the trouble, and take itupononeself. 
Non-implicative predicates include agree, decide, want, hope, promise, plan, intend, try, 
be likely, be eager, be ready, and have in mind. Implicative predicates are similar to factive 
predicates in that the truth of the affirmative main sentence implies the truth of the 
complement. For example, the truth of (64), which involves an implicative verb, implies 
the truth of (65): 
(64) John managed to open the door. 
(65) John opened the door. 
Structural presuppositions fall in various categories. One type of stractural presupposition 
is induced by adverbial clauses, including temporal clauses introduced by such time markers 
as before, while, since, and as. The example given by Frege (1892/1952: 71) about the 
separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark is a classic example of presuppositions 
introduced by such temporal markers as after. 
(66) "After the separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, Prussia and Austria 
quarrelled." 
Frege (1892/1952: 71) states that it is " sufficiently clear that the sense is not to be taken as 
having as a part the thought that Schleswig-Holstein was once separated from Denmark. But 
that this is the necessary presupposition in order for the expression 'After the separation of 
Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark' to have any reference at all". 
Another type of stractural presupposition closely bound with focus and information 
structure is induced by cleft and pseudo-cleft constractions. As noted above, cleft and 
pseudo-cleft constractions provide classic examples of the way topics and foci are handled 
in marked ways to affect the distribution of given/new information and impart 
presuppositions. Through clefts, speakers place focus on the element that follows be. 
Pseudo-cleft sentences also carry a presupposition in the part that follows what so that it is 
taken for granted.9 Widdowson (1978:35) remarks that the effect of clefts is to sepárate out 
given information and place it parenthetically within the subordínate clause. In clefts, the 
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new information appears in a prominent and contrastive positíon at the end of the main 
clause. In written English, where intonatíon is absent, the cleft constructíon marks the 
irrformation focus. As Quirk and Greenbaum (1973:415) state, the bighlighted element has 
the full implication of the contrastive focus, and the rest of the clause is considered as given 
information. The presupposition of a cleft sentence can be identified with a proposition 
formed by taking the material after the relative marker who, or that, and inserting a variable 
or indefinite existential expression like somebody, or something that agrees in number and 
gender with the item in focus position. A cleft sentence is one which begins with the prop 
subject it and verb to be. This string is followed by an element of the clause moved to the 
initial position. The rest of the clause is then introduced by the relative pronoun who or that: 
(67) It was his wife who reported him to the pólice. 
Presupposition: Somebody reported him. 
A pseudo-cleft sentence is one that begins with what and ends with a noun phrase, for the 
purpose of focusing attention on the noun phrase. 
(68) What made him mad was that his wife reported him to the pólice. 
Presupposition: Something made him mad. 
Both cleft and pseudo-cleft constructions seem to convey the further presupposition that the 
focal element is the only element to which the predicates apply. But, as Prince (1978: 883-
906) shows, the two clefts perform different pragmatic functions and cannot be 
interchangeable. Thepresuppositions arising from cleft and pseudo-cleft constructions seem 
also to arise from heavy stress on some constituent, as exempüfied in (69): 
(69) This rumor was/wasn't circulated by JIM, 
where the presupposition of the implicit cleft with the stressed constituent is that someone 
circulated this rumor. 
Presuppositions are induced by comparisons and contrasts. These may be marked by 
particles like too, back, in return, or comparative constructions. The occurrence oíback in 
(70) presupposes that the subject was responding to a cali: 
(70)Icalledhimback. 
Presuppositions can also be triggered by nonrestrictive relative clauses, which provide 
additional parenthetical information (Keenan, 1971: 47).10 These clauses are so called 
because they do not restrict the meaning of the noun phrases they modify. The view that 
such clauses give rise to presupposition is based on the claim that they are not affected by 
the negation of the main verb outside the relative clause. An example of this clause is (71) 
below: 
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(71) President Sadat, who signed a peace treaty with Israel, was assass inated in 1981. 
Counterfactual conditionals induce a type of presupposition called counterfactual 
presupposition in which what is presupposed is contrary to facts. The conditional structure 
in (72) carnes the presupposition that the information in the z/-clause is not true: 
(72) If Mary had come ten minutes earlier, she would have seen James. 
Presupposition: Mary had not come ten minutes earlier. 
Counterfactual presuppositions can also be triggered by such counterfactive verbs as 
pretend and wish: 
(73) Alice pretended she was sick. 
Presupposition: Alice was not sick. 
(74) Maurice wished he had been born rich" 
Presupposition: Maurice was not born rich. 
Presuppositions are also carried by questions. This fact has beenused in arguments favoring 
the handling of presupposition outside the sphere of logical semantics, since questions are 
not propositions that logic can deal with (Leech, 1981: 280). The presuppositions carried 
by questions are somewhat different from the existential presuppositions associated with the 
use of definite referring expressions. The question in (75) below presupposes that something 
happened to the coalition. This presupposition does not remain constantunder negation: 
(75) What happened to the coalition? 
The negation of (75) would make the presupposition, not that something happened to the 
coalition, but rather that there is something that did not happen to it. 
DifferentmterrogativeformseHcitdifferentpresuppositions.Katz(1972:211)maintains 
that yes/no questions generally have vacuous presuppositions, being the disjunctions of their 
possible answers. These are the only kinds of presuppositions of questions that are constant 
under negation. Alternative questions presuppose the disjunction of their answers: 
(76) Do you intend to come or are you just saying that to evade me? 
WTí-questions introduce the presuppositions obtained by replacing the Wh-word by the 
appropriated existentially quantified variable, for example, who: by someone; where: by 
somewhere; how: by somehow. Such presuppositions are not constant under negation. 
(77) Why did they come so early? 
Presupposition: They carne early for some reason. 
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Adverbs also constitute sources of presuppositions. 
(78) Betty moved/didn't move quickly to her room. 
Presupposition: Betty moved to her room. 
6. Presupposition, shared cultural assumptions, and translation 
Contextual considerations and shared knowledge appear to be inextricable components of 
most definitions of presupposition. Thus Fromkin and Rodman (1983: 189) define 
presuppositions as explicit assumptions made by the speakers about the real world, and 
according to them, the sense of an utterance may depend on these assumptions. For "Yule 
(1985:100), a presupposition is "what a speaker assumesis trae orisknownby the hearer". 
In another work, he defines presupposition as"something the speaker assumes to be the case 
prior to making an utterance" (1996:25). Discussing the role of context inthe interpretation 
of discourse, Brown and Yule (1983: 23) adoptthe view that presupposition is "defined in 
terms of assumptions that the speaker makes about what the hearer is likely to accept 
without challenge." Levinson's definition of presupposition is based on mutual knowledge 
and appropriacy: "An utterance A pragmatically presupposes a proposition B iff A is 
appropriate only if B is mutually knownby participants" (1983: 205). Leech's definition 
also places the speaker at the heart of the relation: "In saying X the speaker s purports to 
take for granted the truth of F (1981:287). 
The claim that cultural differences andunshared presuppositions are major obstacles in 
translation is not especially controversial. Malinowski's experience with the Trobrianders 
is a classic example. Malinowski (1923: 299-300) considere the unification of cultural 
context a prerequisite for translation. In fect, his famous theory of context of situation was 
influenced by the question of the translation of untranslatable words. In his ethnography of 
the Trobriand Islands, a small group of islands to the east of New Guinea, Malinowski 
illustrates the problem of translation by giving indigenous texts taken from native 
Trobrianders, followed by word-for-word translations. One problem he has to cope with in 
the translation is that English does not have acceptable equivalente to indigenous words. For 
him, the reason lies in the wide gap between the Western European culture of his readers 
and the Trobriand culture. Even when English equivalents of native words were acceptable, 
their intelügibility was in question. 
The lexical and syntactic structures of a language, with which presuppositions are 
bound, cannot be separated from the culture of which tbis language ispart.11 Commenting 
on this mtertwining between language and its natural cultural context, McLendon (1977: 
153) argües that "real sentences in real languages naturally occur almost uniquely in 
discourse contexts, and considering sentences extracted from their natural contexts 
necessarily risks excluding information pertinent to understanding their true meaning and 
function." 
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Languages are distinctive in the way they express the cultures with which they are 
integrated, and they segment reality in individual ways. It is through their unique systems 
of distinctive sounds, morphemes, and longer linguistic structures that they express culture-
specific concepts of customs, objects, and institutions.n Given this fact, cultural relativity 
has been considered a source of translation difficulties (see for example Hudson, 1980:85). 
This is not especially controversial. Culture, according to one definition, is "the way of life 
and its manifestations that are peculiar to a community that uses a particular language as its 
means of expression" (Newmark, 1995: 94). Since meanings can be expressed in one 
language and not in others, one would expect cultural specificity to have a significant 
bearing on the theory and practice of translation.. To circumvent such problems, translators 
may adopt various techniques including the use of new forms to express the meaning in 
question, the use of SL words in transliterated forms, unpacking SL cultural words, or 
sometimes sacrificing the words that are deemed unimportant. The extent to which 
presuppositions associated with cultural words are lost or preserved in the translation may 
depend on the translator's own assessment of the amount of meaning presuppositions 
contribute to the text. Judging whether the SL presuppositions add little or nothing to the 
TL context, or whether they cause, rather than solve, comprehension problems, translators 
may opt for doing away with them. 
Concepts pecuhar to a certain culture may be expressed by means of definite noun 
phrases which carry existential presuppositions. They may also be denoted with lexical 
items that carry lexical presuppositions. If such concepts do not exist in the TL culture, the 
SL presuppositions are likely to be lost in the translation, and the whole context may be 
affected, as contexts expand with the addition of more presuppositions, and communication 
may be rendered less successful. I3_ 
One difficulty translators usually íace is the handling of shared assumptions and 
presuppositions, and judging the extent to which a given presupposition is really required 
for the TL readership. As Cook (1989: 90) points out, the underestimation of shared 
assumptions in discourse makes it boring, while an overestimation of it makes it 
incomprehensible. 
The claim that the unification of cultural context makes translation an easier task 
(Malinowsky, 1923: 299-300; Robins, 1980: 24) underlies the general agreement that 
prefect translation between languages is impossible. The ideal of total equivalence is very 
much dubious, and has even been described as a chimera (Bell, 1991: 6). Translating the 
whole communicative valué of a language requires the translation of all the semantic and 
pragmatic valúes carried by the socio-semantic system of that language. The more types of 
meaning a translation can maintain (for example, conceptual, thematic, connotative, social, 
affective, reflected, and collocative), the closer it is to an "ideal" translation. 
As shown above, words and syntactic structures carry presuppositions. If these words 
and structures are distinctive of a certain cultures, the presuppositions will also be unique 
to that culture. In addition, if pragmatic presuppositions are defined in terms of shared 
assumptions, mutual knowledge, and contextual appropriacy, then they make direct 
reference to culture for their interpretation. In other words, what is presupposed in a culture 
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need not be presupposed in another. Mey (1993: 298) remarks that "cultural 
presuppositions can be major stumbling-blocks on the road to understanding" across 
different cultures. Intercultural misunderstanding may result because participants do not 
share cultural presuppositions, as in the exchange below which Mey (1993: 299) had with 
a Japanese temple attendant: 
Tourist: Is there a toilet around here? 
Attendant: You want to use? 
Tourist (somewhat astonished): Sure I do. 
Attendant: Go down the steps. 
According to Mey, the highly unexpected back-channel question 'You want to use?' was 
made because the pragmatic presuppositions in the Japanese culture are clearly different 
from his own. One possible reason the attendant asked the question was to find out whether 
the tourist's question could nave anything to do with the different kinds of toilets (Japanese, 
Western) that are now available in Japan. Misunderstanding cultural presuppositions may 
also result in mistranslation, or at least, cause translation problems. 
7. Conclusión 
Presupposition is a pragmatic inference that is intrinsically linked to thematic meaning, 
shared knowledge, and given information, and has a significant role to play in the 
translation of thematic meaning, and assigning the same valúes of prominence given to 
information constituents in the SL text. Failure to transíate it resulte in distorting the 
thematic meaning of the SL text, and so does the addition in the TL text of presuppositions 
that do not exist in the original. The more the translation preserves the status of figure and 
ground of anutterance, the more feithful and accurate it is. 
Presupposition is a type of inference that can be confused with entailment or 
implicature, which are also types of inference connected with the use of certain forros of 
language. Each, however, has its own distinctive properties. Presupposition differs from 
entailment in that it is essentially a property of utterances that disappears in certain linguistic 
contexto, and certain linguistic structures. Entailment is a purely logical concept concerned 
with propositions, and is not affected by the context. Implicature is a pragmatic context-
dependent concept based on cooperative dynamics among speakers. A careful choice of the 
lexemes and structures that yield this particular inference in the TL text would therefore 
ensure that the resulting inference is presupposition, rather than entailment or implicature. 
The concept of presupposition is not confined to a particular language, but the ways it 
is realized differ from one language to another, henee its relevance to a linguistic theory of 
translation. Presupposition is a pragmatic inference triggered by certain lexemes and 
structures, which include definite descriptions, fective and counterfective predicates, 
implicative verbs, change-of-state verbs, and verbs of judging. The structures which trigger 
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presuppositions comprise cleft and pseudo-cleft constructions, extrapositions, and some 
conditíonals and adverbial clauses. An accurate and economic translation of thematic 
meaning cannot be achieved unless the SL presuppositions are relayed in the TL text. This 
is possible through the use of the appropriate structures and lexical items that give rise to 
this inference and achieve the same pragmatic effect. This is more likely to happen in a 
semantic translation that lays more emphasis on authorship than readership. In this 
translation method, presuppositions are more likely to be perceived as background 
assumptions differing from assertions, and carrying the same relative importance assigned 
to them in the original. 
Notes 
1. The relation between reference and presupposition is detailed in Frege Uber Sinn und 
Bedeutung, translated as 'On Sense and Reference' in Geach and Black (1952). Frege's views were 
refuted by Russell (1905), but advocated by Strawson (1950; 1952). The notion has been intriguing 
to linguists for the last thirty years or so. 
2. The projection problem for presuppositions refers to the particular problem of how 
presuppositions of component sentences behave when these components are part of complex and 
compound sentences. Consider for example: (a) Sally does not regret buying a Mercedes, and (b) 
Sally does not regret buying a Mercedes, because infactshe neverbought one. The presupposition 
induced by the factive verb regret in (a) fails to be inherited in the compound sentence (b). 
Presupposition also disappears in certain contexts. In the example Sue died before shefinished the 
thesis, the proposition that Sue finished the thesis is not presupposed, as it contrasts our basic 
beliefs and knowledge of the world, namely that people do not do things when they die. The 
presupposition, however, would hold in Sue cried before shefinished the thesis. Herenon-linguistic 
factors affectthe survival of presuppositions. 
3. In written Arabic, subjects, objects, and verbs can come in initial, medial, or final positions. 
Special suffixes indícate the status of the part of speech. In spoken Arabic, however, utterances 
generally begin with subjects, and in cases when subjects are omitted, the verb form indicates the 
subject, as in Spanish soy, which indicates that the subject is I. 
4. In written Arabic, subjects, objects, and verbs can come in initial, medial, or final positions. 
Special suffixes indícate the status of the part of speech. 
5. The term rheme goes back to the Greek word rhema, that is, what is said. 
6. The question of violating categorial presuppositions has received little attention in the 
presuppositional literature compared to the violatíon of existential presupposition like the one 
involved in the famous example The king of France is bald. This can be perhaps traced to the fact 
that the violatíon of categorial presupposition, unlike the violation of existential presupposition, can 
be accounted for as being anomalous within the framework of sentence-based semantics. 
7. For Halliday, the subject is a complex of four distinct functions which coincide unless there 
is some reason for them not to do so. Three of these functions lie in the structure of the clause and 
the fourth lies in the structure of the information unit. These are (1) the actor, which is a lógica! 
subject; (2) the modal subject, or the grammatical subject; (3) the theme which is a psychological 
subject and finally (4) given information, which is another psychological subject that relates to the 
textual aspect of language. For more details see Halliday (1970, pp. 140-165). 
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8. Arabic belongs to the vast majority of languages which, as Lyons (1995: 67) points out, do 
not have a sepárate word-form which can be identified grammatically and semantically with the 
English definite article. 
9. The effects produced by the passive, cleftconstructions and extraposed sentences, and other 
syntactic structures are treated by Jacobs and Rosenbaum (1971) in terms of transformational 
theory, together with the processes whereby deep structures are transformed into surface structures 
that contribute a special effect to style. 
10. Green (1989: 85) opposes the view that sentences with nonrestrictive clauses presuppose 
the truth of the relative dause, indicating that "all analysts agree that in fací nonrestrictive relative 
clauses are asserted rather than presupposed." Commenting on the example "Taylor, who has a 42-
inch vertical leap, will be a sophomore next year", Green says the rational speaker of the utterance 
does not take it for granted that the addressee realizes that Taylor has a 42-inch vertical leap. 
"Tnstead", sheadds, "thenonrestrictiveclause... offersawayofassertingthatinformation, while 
not making it the main point of his utterance." 
11. To cope with translation difficulties arising from cultural differences, Newmark (1995: 94-
103) suggests that the solution to such problems depends not so much on the collocations of 
linguistic or situational context as on the readership and on the setting. Among the procedures he 
suggests are deletion of redundant stretches of language in non-authoritative texts, such as 
metaphors and intensifiers, adopting paraphrases, glossaries, notes, transference, naturalization 
and literal translation. 
12. As Lyons (1977: 248) remarks, every language is integrated with the culture in which it 
operates, and its lexical structure reflects those distinctions which are important in the culture. 
13. Successful communication, Cook(1989: 91)remarks, involves the transfer of information, 
which "presupposes a successful evaluation of what is known or not known at the outset." 
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